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RESUMÉ
This report is about how NATO might adapt to a shifting strategic environment. The 
strategic environment that is currently unfolding seems likely to be characterized by 
complexity and increased diversity in both power and principle. The report focuses on 
how the Alliance needs to respond to the on-going changes by moving forward at the 
upcoming Warsaw Summit from the decisions taken at the September 2014 summit 
in Wales. The report starts from the premise that, although the decisions taken in 
9CNGUYGTGKORQTVCPVCPFNQPIQXGTFWGVJG[CTGPQVUWHƒEKGPVVQHCEKNKVCVG0#61ŨU
continued adaptation to a fundamentally changed strategic environment. The 
EJCNNGPIGHQT0#61KPVJGHWVWTGYKNNDGVQƒPFCYC[VQEQPVTKDWVGVQ'WTQRGCPCPF
INQDCNUGEWTKV[KPCUVTCVGIKEGPXKTQPOGPVKPYJKEJVJG#NNKCPEGCPFŧVJG9GUVŨJCXGC
diminished role among new and (re)-emerging actors and in which liberal values and 
Western principles for order-making can no longer be assumed to be universal. The 
report suggests that NATO should assume the development of a future strategic 
GPXKTQPOGPVVJCVECPDGUVDGFGUETKDGFCUCŧOWNVKQTFGTYQTNFŨ0#61UJQWNFRTGRCTG
for such a multi-order world by collective defence initiatives from the Wales Summit 
CPFD[TGXKVCNK\KPI0#61ŨURCTVPGTUJKRRQNKE[6JGTGRQTVUWIIGUVUVJCVŧIQKPIDCEMVQ
DCUKEUŨD[EQPEGPVTCVKPIQPEQNNGEVKXGFGHGPUGYQWNFDGCPKPCRRTQRTKCVGTGURQPUGCU




ACT  Allied Command Transformation
AIIB  Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
ASEAN  Association of South East Asian Nations
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System
AU  African Union
CPG  Comprehensive Political Guidance
DCDC  Development Concept and Doctrine Center
DDPR  Defence and Deterrence Posture Review 
EU  European Union
FC  Framework Nation
FNC  Framework Nation Concept
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HRF  High Readiness Force
IS  Islamic State
MSC  Munich Security Conference
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Association
NIC  National Intelligence Council
NRF  NATO Response Force
PC  Political Committee
PII  Partnership Interoperability Initiative
RAP  Readiness Action Plan
SAC  Strategic Analysis Capability
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe
VJTF  Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
6 PREPARING FOR NATOS WARSAW SUMMIT PREPARING FOR NATOS WARSAW SUMMIT 7
INTRODUCTION
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remain relevant in a dramatically altered global strategic environment. From this 
RGTURGEVKXG0#61ŨUVTCPUHQTOCVKQPCPFKVUCDKNKV[VQCFCRVVQUVTCVGIKEEJCPIGVCMGQP
a more critical importance. Moreover, this suggests that, although going back to 
DCUKEUŨUJQWNFDGUGGPCUCPWTIGPVCPFPGEGUUCT[TGRCKTVQGNGOGPVUQHVJG#NNKCPEG
that have long been neglected, the task ahead is to respond to more far-reaching 
strategic change, which challenges the fundamental principles of the international 
order that was established after the Second World War.3 
The report demonstrates that change in the international system, which is often 
talked about as belonging in a distant future, is already materializing as witnessed in 
the Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine, the rise of Daesh and the increased 
VGPUKQPUQP0#61ŨUUQWVJGTPHNCPMCUYGNNCUVJGŧTGDCNCPEKPIŨQHVJG7PKVGF5VCVGU
towards Asia. All of these seemingly separate developments are symptoms of 
fundamental change in the global strategic environment that NATO can ill afford to 
KIPQTG6JGTGRQTVCTIWGUVJCV0#61PQYPGGFUVQRTGRCTGOQTGURGEKƒECNN[VJCPKV
has done in the past for the emerging strategic environment. The report presents 
three different possible interpretations of the character of that environment. Although 
all three interpretations envisage plausible futures, the most likely strategic reality is a 
ŧOWNVKQTFGTYQTNFŨKPYJKEJFKHHGTGPVKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTFGTUGCEJYKVJFKHHGTGPVCKOUCPF
different ordering principles, will co-exist. The challenge ahead is to ensure the 
RGCEGHWNVTCPUKVKQPVQCŧOWNVKQTFGTYQTNFŨCPFVQHQTIGCPQXGTCNNEQPUGPUWUHQTJQY
to maintain order and stability in a more diffuse and complex strategic environment. 
Key to the success of such an undertaking is to establish partnerships across dividing 
NKPGUYJKNUVCNUQOCKPVCKPKPIWPKV[YKVJKPVJGŧNKDGTCNQTFGTŨCPFOCKPVCKPKPIUWHƒEKGPV
defence and crisis management capabilities to deter incursions such as those seen in 
Ukraine and to be able to respond to crisis management needs as they arise. Based 
QPVJKUCPCN[UKU VJGTGRQTVCTIWGUVJCVRTKXKNGIKPI LWUVQPGQH0#61ŨUEQTGVCUMUŤ
EQNNGEVKXGFGHGPEGŤCVVJGGZRGPUGQHETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVCPFEQQRGTCVKXGUGEWTKV[
would be a mistake that NATO cannot afford to make. 
The report aims to contribute to the debate about NATO in a changing world, in 
particular to contribute to the preparations for the upcoming Warsaw Summit and to 
make the case for looking past the immediate and clearly visible challenges to less 
tangible, though no less important, changes in the international system. It is hoped 
that the analysis presented in the following pages will contribute to building a 
consensus for decisions at Warsaw, one that may move the Alliance into a position 
YJGTGKVOC[DGCDNGVQCEJKGXGOQTGVJCPOGTGN[ŧVKPMGTKPIŨYKVJVJGDCNCPEGDGVYGGP
the three core tasks. If so the Alliance will be better equipped for meeting the 
challenges ahead. 
 Looking back, few of us could have predicted the events of 2014,  
YJKEJYKNNDGTGOGODGTGFCUC[GCTQHUKIPKƒECPVEJCPIGKPVJG 
global security environment.




continuing actions to destabilize Ukraine, and the rapid rise of Daesh1 QP 0#61ŨU
UQWVJGTPDQTFGTŤJCXGVWTPGFVJG'WTQRGCPUVTCVGIKEUGEWTKV[GPXKTQPOGPVWRUKFG
down. For many the dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia suggested 
VJCV0#61UJQWNFIQŧDCEMVQDCUKEUŨD[KPETGCUKPIKVUHQEWUQPKVUVTCFKVKQPCNTQNGCUC
VGTTKVQTKCN FGHGPUG CNNKCPEG YJKNG TGFWEKPI 0#61ŨU QVJGT EQTG VCUMU PCOGN[ ETKUKU
management and cooperative security. These concerns were addressed at the Wales 
Summit in September 2014, where a number of initiatives were agreed that were 
designed to bolster the readiness and ability of the Alliance to live up to its Article Five 
commitments. However, the Wales Summit happened so soon after the dramatic 
downturn in the relationship with Russia, and only a few weeks after the surprising 
appearance of Daesh in Mosul in June 2014, that the wider strategic repercussions of 
VJGUGGXGPVUCPFVJGFGOCPFUVJG[RNCEGQP0#61ŨUVTCPUHQTOCVKQPEQWNFPQVDGHWNN[
covered. It is expected that the fuller implications of the events will be addressed at 
the next summit, which will take place in Warsaw in July 2016.2 
The challenge ahead is to ensure the peaceful transition to a 
multi-order world and to forge an overall consensus for how 
to maintain order and stability in a more diffuse and complex 
strategic environment.
This report is about how NATO should prepare for a new strategic environment, and in 
particular how the Alliance might move forward from the decisions taken in Wales to 
be able to undertake further adaptation at the Warsaw Summit to ensure that the 
Alliance will still be relevant in a dramatically changed strategic environment. The 
report starts from the premise that rather than the events of 2014 questioning the 
international order and demanding that NATO should concentrate on its defense 
ECRCDKNKV[VQOGGVRCTVKEWNCTEJCNNGPIGUQP0#61ŨUGCUVGTPCPFUQWVJGTPDQTFGTUVJG
events of 2014 happened because the international order is in question and they 
suggest that NATO must step up its efforts to move towards major transformation to 




what kind of strategic environment they view as likely to characterize the future. This 
must be the starting point for any consideration of adaptation measures and policy 
direction in a new and rapidly changing strategic environment. The report recommends 
VJCV 0#61 CPF VJG '7 DQVJ CFQRV VJG PQVKQP QH C ŧOWNVKQTFGT HWVWTGŨ CU VJG OQUV
accurate description of the emerging strategic environment.
6JG #NNKCPEG UJQWNF TGEQIPK\G VJCV 0#61ŨU EQTG VCUMU CTG PQV LWUV PKEGVQJCXG
elements, but that all three core tasks are essential for maintaining Alliance cohesion 
and relevance in the new emerging environment. In particular, if the Alliance decides 
(as is reported) to adopt a new Strategic Concept earlier than anticipated, the new 
Concept should recognize the continued importance of all three tasks, even though 
the importance afforded to individual core tasks may vary according to the strategic 
context at any given time.
NATO (and indeed the West more generally) should prioritize two overarching strategic 
goals: 1) to work towards establishing the conditions for a peaceful transformation 
to a cooperative multi-order world by seeking a working consensus on order-making 
RTKPEKRNGUCVVJGINQDCNNGXGNCPFVQYQTMVQYCTFUUVTGPIVJGPKPIVJGŧNKDGTCNEQTGŨQH
the liberal order by addressing existing internal weaknesses, living up to its own liberal 
principles, and continuing to encourage those states that share liberal core values to 
associate themselves with the liberal order.
Although NATO should consider carefully each case of possible involvement in crisis 
management, it should be recognised that crisis management is NOT an optional extra, 
but is increasingly the foundation of a new transatlantic bargain in which the United 
5VCVGUJCUŧTGDCNCPEGFŨVQYCTFU#UKCDWVEQPVKPWGUVQWPFGTYTKVG#TVKENG(KXGKPTGVWTP
HQTVJG#NNKGUŨYKNNKPIPGUUVQEQPVTKDWVGVQETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVQRGTCVKQPUYJGPECNNGFHQT
The role of cooperative security and partnership as an essential diplomatic tool in a multi-
order world must be recognized, and NATO should aim to revitalize its partnership policy 
in accordance with a revised Berlin Agreement which incorporates the understanding of 
the emerging strategic environment suggested above.
THE REPORT IS DIVIDED INTO SIX SECTIONS:
1  +P VJG ƒTUV UGEVKQP VJG TGRQTV DTKGHN[ QWVNKPGU VJG FGEKUKQPU VCMGP CV VJG 9CNGU
Summit. 
2  +P VJG UGEQPF UGEVKQP VJG TGRQTV VWTPU VQ 0#61ŨU VJTGG EQTG VCUMU CU FGGRN[
embedded characteristics that have contributed to its remarkable longevity and its 
ability to adapt to strategic change. 
3  In the third section, the report outlines the changes that are currently taking place 
in the global strategic environment and describes how both NATO and the EU are 
engaged in strategic analysis as part of their preparations for the Warsaw Summit 
and for a new Global Security Strategy document. The report argues that it would 
DG DGPGƒEKCN KH VJG VYQ RTQEGUUGU EQWNF DG CNKIPGF UQ VJCV DQVJ QTICPK\CVKQPU
take their point of departure in the same overall interpretation of what kind of 
international order is in the making. 
4  In the fourth section, the report turns to three competing narratives about what 
kind of international order is emerging. Each of the three narratives offers a 
plausible future, but they also differ on important issues. Deciding which one to 
HQNNQYCRRGCTUVQDGVJGƒTUVUVGRKPVJGRTQEGUUQHCFCRVCVKQPCFGEKUKQPVJCVYKNN
have important policy implications for how NATO (and the EU) move forward. 
5  +PVJGƒHVJUGEVKQPVJGTGRQTVUWIIGUVUVJCVVJGPCTTCVKXGCDQWVCOWNVKQTFGTHWVWTG
provides the most relevant interpretation of what kind of international order is in 
the making. The report outlines how the emerging order is different from past 
historical international systems, and it highlights the growing requirement of new 
thinking on institutional frameworks and forms of cooperation, especially through 
partnerships.  On this basis the report argues that the multi-order narrative and the 
GOGTIGPEGQHCOWNVKQTFGTYQTNFUJQWNFHQTOVJGHQWPFCVKQPHQT0#61ŨURTQEGUU
of adapting. 
6  +P VJG ƒPCN UGEVKQP VJG TGRQTV QWVNKPGU YJCV KU TGICTFGF CU PGEGUUCT[ EJCPIG
KP0#61ŨU VJTGGEQTG VCUMU VQGPUWTG VJCV VJG#NNKCPEG KU TGCF[ HQTCOWNVKQTFGT
world characterized by diversity in power, principles, institutional architecture and 
domestic governance structures. In the scenario outlined in the report, going back 
VQDCUKEUŨKUPQVCPQRVKQPKH0#61KUVQTGOCKPTGNGXCPVYKVJKPCRTQHQWPFN[FKHHGTGPV
strategic environment. 
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THE WALES SUMMIT 
 GOING BACK TO BASICS?
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The dramatic events during 2014 led almost immediately to calls for NATO to go back 
VQDCUKEUŨ VJTQWIJC TGPGYGFGORJCUKUQPEQNNGEVKXGFGHGPEG6JGUGECNNUYGTG VQ
UQOGGZVGPVOGVCV0#61ŨU5WOOKVKP9CNGUCUVJG5WOOKV&GENCTCVKQPTGKVGTCVGF
that the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories 
CPFRQRWNCVKQPUCICKPUVCVVCEMCUUGVQWVKP#TVKENG(KXGQHVJG9CUJKPIVQP6TGCV[Ũ
(NATO, 2014: para 2). In order to be able to live up to those commitments better, the 
summit agreed a new Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to reassure jittery 
GCUVGTPOGODGTUCPFVQDQNUVGT0#61ŨUTGCFKPGUUCPFKVUCDKNKV[VQNKXGWRVQKVU#TVKENG
Five commitments. The RAP included both measures to reassure those member 
states that felt at risk and adaptation measures, including a number of components 
required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might 
face (see Box 2). 
The centrepiece of the adaptation measures is the decision to develop a permanent, 
DTKICFGUK\GFŧURGCTJGCFŨHQTEGVJGTCVJGTENWOUKN[PCOGF8GT[*KIJ4GCFKPGUU,QKPV
Task Force (VJTF). The VJTF constitutes an enhancement of the much bigger and 
already existing NATO Response Force (NRF) and will consist of a land brigade of 
around 5,000 troops, which will be supported by air, sea, and special operations 
forces. The VJTF will be backed up by two brigades forming a rapid reinforcement 
ECRCDKNKV[QHCRRTQZKOCVGN[VTQQRU
.WVG6JGŧURGCTJGCFŨHQTEGYKNNDG
able to deploy within a few days to respond to any security challenges that might arise 
QP0#61ŨURGTKRJGT[CPFKVYKNNDGUWRRQTVGFD[CRGTOCPGPVEQOOCPFCPFEQPVTQN
presence and in-place force enablers such as vehicles, weapons and other equipment 
to be stored on the territories of its eastern members. 
To reassure primarily its eastern members, the Wales Summit agreed that NATO 
would shift its posture towards the eastern part of the Alliance by setting up six small 
command and control centres across its eastern flank, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is envisaged that the centres could serve as 
reception bases either for exercising forces, orin the event of a crisisfor facilitating 
the reinforcement of an eastern member, including the deployment of the VJTF. In 
addition to the six centres, the existing corps-level headquarters in Szczecin, Poland, 





minds set on permanent bases on their territory as part of the RAP. However, this 
initiative was deemed to be in breach of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and in 
any case it presupposed the availability of hardware that is no longer available.
BOX 2: THE DECISIONS OF THE WALES SUMMIT
#VVJG9CNGU5WOOKVKP5GRVGODGT0#61OGODGTUCITGGFVQŧOQXGVQYCTFUŨVJG
two percent threshold for defence expenditure within a decade and to spend twenty 
percent of that on major equipment. The summit launched a series of initiatives designed 
VQ DQNUVGT 0#61ŨU TGCFKPGUU CPF CDKNKV[ VQ NKXG WR VQ KVU #TVKENG (KXG EQOOKVOGPVU
6JG 4GCFKPGUU #EVKQP 2NCP 
4#2 EQPVCKPU VYQ RKNNCTU Ť #UUWTCPEG /GCUWTGU CPF
Adaptation Measures.
ASSURANCE MEASURES ADAPTATION MEASURES
Q Continuous (rotational) air, land and 
sea presence and activity in the 
eastern part of the Alliance
Q Increased Baltic air-policing
Q #9#%5UWTXGKNNCPEGQXGT0#61ŨU
eastern area
Q Increased sea patrols in the Baltic, 
Black Sea and Mediterranean





Q Increased presence of air and  
ground forces (on a bilateral basis)  
KP0#61ŨUGCUVGTPCTGC
Q Enhancing the NATO Response Force 
(NRF)
Q As part of NRF enhancement, the 





Q Establish a multinational NATO  
command and control presence on 
VJGVGTTKVQTKGUQH0#61ŨUGCUVGTP 
members with rotational personnel
Q Raising the readiness and capabilities 
of the HQ Multinational Corps North 
East (Szczecin) and enhancing its role 
as a hub for regional cooperation
Q Pre-positioning of military equipment 
and supplies
Q +ORTQXGOGPVUVQ0#61ŨUCDKNKV[VQ 
reinforce its eastern members 
through the preparation of national 
KPHTCUVTWEVWTG
CKTƒGNFUCPFRQTVU
Q Update NATO defence plans for  
eastern Europe  
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The Russian use of hybrid warfare in Crimea and eastern Ukraine also resulted in 
the Wales Summit addressing this issue. The Summit Declaration tasked the work 
on hybrid warfare to be reviewed alongside the implementation of the RAP. This 
would include enhancing strategic communications, developing hybrid exercise 
scenarios, and strengthening the coordination between NATO and other 
organizations with a view to improving information-sharing, political consultations 
and staff-to-staff coordination. However, as Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee point 
out (2014), non-traditional threats short of open warfare require non-traditional 
responses. Yet were such tactics to be used on the territory of a NATO member, 
sending a rapid response force would do little against propaganda, political 
manipulation and armed gangs at the local level. Moreover, other organizations 
such as the EU may be better suited to responding to hybrid threats, which makes 
the Alliance more dependent on the decisions of other actors and further complicates 
the design of coherent and effective responses to these new challenges (Drent and 
Zandee, 2014:18). 
The centrepiece of the adaptation measures is the decision to 
develop a permanent, brigade-sized spearhead force, the rather 
clumsily named Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.
+PCFFKVKQPVQVJGURGEKƒEOGCUWTGUCITGGFCVVJG9CNGU5WOOKVVJGUWOOKVCNUQ
sought to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and to make the most 
GHƒEKGPVWUGQHVJGHWPFUCXCKNCDNGVJTQWIJITGCVGTFGHGPUGKPFWUVTKCNEQQRGTCVKQP
pooling and sharing and cooperative initiatives where possible. Allies pledged to halt 
the decline in defense spending and pledged to increase defense expenditure in real 
terms as GDP grows and to move towards the two percent guideline within a decade, 
allocating twenty percent of total defense expenditure to major new equipment and 
research and development. However, no sooner was the print dry on the Summit 
Declaration before several members indicated their doubts as to the economic 
feasibility of achieving the two percent aim. Moreover, although referred to as a 
ŧRNGFIGŨKVKUCRNGFIGFGXQKFQHCP[DKPFKPIEQOOKVOGPV
Originally the Wales Summit had been intended as a post-Afghanistan Summit 
designed to examine how the Alliance could maintain the expertise and inter-
operability achieved through more than a decade of involvement in Afghanistan. In 
the event, the topics of Russia and the Ukraine crisis became the central issues the 
summit dealt with, and the question of partnerships took on a more modest role. 
However, the summit launched a new Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) with 
partners who had built up interoperability with NATO through their participation in 
0#61 QRGTCVKQPU Ť GURGEKCNN[ KP #HIJCPKUVCP 6JG KPKVKCVKXG KPENWFGF  FKHHGTGPV
RCTVPGTU QH YJKEJ ƒXG ŧUWRGT RCTVPGTUŨ Ť 5YGFGP (KPNCPF )GQTIKC ,QTFCP CPF
#WUVTCNKCŤYGTGQHHGTGFGPJCPEGFQRRQTVWPKVKGUYKVJKPVJGKPKVKCVKXG/QTGIGPGTCNN[
the Declaration stressed that NATO and its partners form a unique community of 
values committed to the principles of individual freedom, democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law, and stressed that NATO would continue to engage actively with 
YJCVVJGVGZVTGHGTUVQCUŧTGNGXCPVEQWPVTKGUŨCPFKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPU6JG
Summit Declaration also acknowledged that the current strategic environment 
highlighted the need for strengthening the relationship between the EU and NATO, 
and especially for them to continue to work side by side in crisis management 
operations, broaden political consultations, and promote complementarity between 
the two organizations. However, although cooperative security was clearly alluded 
to in the Declaration, and although new partnership initiatives were established, the 
QXGTCNNRTQƒNGQHVJGNCVVGTCRRGCTGFVQDGTCVJGTOQFGUV+PFGGFQPG0#61QHƒEKCN
EQORNCKPGFVJCVEQQRGTCVKXGUGEWTKV[CRRGCTGFVQŧJCXGHCNNGPQHHVJGYCIQPŨYKVJ
too many partners and not enough substantive political engagement. 
Is traditional deterrence still a viable strategy in the face of 
new forms of warfare such as hybrid warfare and new forms  
of actors such as Daesh?
6JG5WOOKV&GENCTCVKQPCNUQVTKGFXCNKCPVN[VQKPENWFGKUUWGUTGNCVGFVQ0#61ŨUQVJGT
core tasks, crisis management and cooperative security. The Declaration stressed 
the growing insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa and reiterated that the 
RAP was not only oriented towards Russia, but should also be regarded as a 
TGURQPUG VQ EJCNNGPIGU KP VJG #NNKCPEGŨU UQWVJGTP PGKIJDQTJQQF +V YCU UVTGUUGF
that the planned measures were intended to strengthen not only collective defense, 
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but also the crisis management capabilities of the alliance as a whole. However, 
given the emphasis on the pre-placement of equipment and the enhancement of 
EQOOCPFCPFEQPVTQNKPVJGGCUVGTPRCTVQHVJG#NNKCPEGKVKUFKHƒEWNVVQUGGJQYVJG
4#2ECPCFFTGUUVJGEQPEGTPUQH0#61ŨUUQWVJGTPOGODGTU/QTGQXGTCNVJQWIJ
the enhanced attention to territorial defense was clearly necessary to reassure 
those members who felt particularly vulnerable, and despite the efforts to point to 
the simultaneous crisis management capabilities contained in the RAP, the overall 
framing of the Wales initiatives seemed to contradict two decades of evolving NATO 
doctrine, culminating in the agreement expressed in the Strategic Concept from 
VJCV0#61JCUVJTGGEQTGVCUMUŤEQNNGEVKXGFGHGPUGETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVCPF
cooperative security (NATO, 2010).
9KVJKP VJG EQPVGZV QH VJG ECNNU VQ ŧIQ DCEM VQ DCUKEUŨ CPF PQVYKVJUVCPFKPI VJG
assurances that the RAP may be equally relevant for Article Five contingencies in 
the east and for crisis management contingencies to the south, the Wales Summit 
seems to have been interpreted by many to have elevated collective defense into a 
URGEKCNRQUKVKQP/QTGQXGTCNVJQWIJVJGTGKUCITGGOGPVVJCV0#61ŨUTGCFKPGUUCPF
reassurance capability needs to be strengthened, there is less agreement on what 
that actually entails. Can the threats from the east and the south really be met with 
the same initiatives? Is traditional deterrence still a viable strategy in the face of new 
forms of warfare such as hybrid warfare and new forms of actors such as Daesh? 
How useful is a very high degree of military readiness if the political decision-making 
procedures for using that readiness are slow and cumbersome? Moreover, what 
kind of relationship can NATO (re)-build with Russia, and what role will partnerships 
play in a future strategic environment where the assumption of a community of 
values cannot be assumed to be the driving force? These are some of the questions 
that have arisen from the Wales Summit and which the Warsaw Summit in 2016 
needs to address.
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AN ALLIANCE RESTING ON 
THREE PILLARS
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0#61ŨUEWTTGPV5VTCVGIKE%QPEGRVCITGGFKP.KUDQPKPKUQHVGPETGFKVGFYKVJVJG
KPVTQFWEVKQP QH 0#61ŨU ŧVJTGG %UŨ QT VJTGG EQTG VCUMU EQNNGEVKXG FGHGPEG ETKUKU
management, and cooperative security (NATO, 2010). The move to elevate crisis 
OCPCIGOGPVCPFEQQRGTCVKXGUGEWTKV[VQEQTGVCUMUQPCRCTYKVJ0#61ŨUVTCFKVKQPCNN[
regarded primary task of collective defense was controversial when it was introduced 
in 2010, and it was never fully endorsed by all member states, especially those in the 
east (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2011). Nevertheless, the inclusion was politically 
RQUUKDNG RCTVN[ DGECWUG VJG OQXG OGTGN[ EQFKƒGF YJCV YCU CNTGCF[ GUVCDNKUJGF
practice, and partly because the consultation process prior to the formulation of the 
Strategic Concept had emphasized the growing complexity of the emerging strategic 
environment and the necessity of the Alliance to be able to play a full role in all three 
EQTG VCUMU 6JG TGUWNV JCU DGGP VJCV 0#61ŨU EWTTGPV 5VTCVGIKE %QPEGRV Ť VJG MG[
QRGTCVKQPCNUVTCVGIKEFQEWOGPVQHVJG#NNKCPEGŤJCUFGƒPGFVJG#NNKCPEGCUGUUGPVKCNN[
an organization resting on three equal pillars. 
The Alliance was called on more times than anticipated, and 
in situations that turned out to be far more demanding than 
expected. 
0#61KUŤCPFCNYC[UYCUŤOQTGVJCPŧLWUVŨCFGHGPUGCNNKCPEG6JKUKUENGCTN[UVCVGF
in the Washington Treaty, which emphasizes collective defense in Article Five, but 
which also expresses a commitment to cooperative security through Article Two by 
committing the Alliance to contribute toward peaceful and friendly international 
relations by strengthening a rule-based international order and by bringing about a 
better understanding of the principles upon which that order is based (NATO, 1949: art 
2). In this sense NATO had from its inception two different roles based on two different 
KFGPVKVKGUTQQVGF KPDQVJRQYGTCPFRCTVPGTUJKR#NVJQWIJVJG ŧRCTVPGT KFGPVKV[ŨYCU
secondary in practice and less clearly articulated than the power-based defense 
CNNKCPEG KFGPVKV[Ũ DQVJ YGTG KP NKPG YKVJ #OGTKECP ITCPF UVTCVGI[ YJKEJ CNYC[U
emphasized both power and partnership (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007) and which 
was visible in the parallel policies of containment and internationalism. 
Although the power identity was clearly more prevalent during the Cold War, the 
partnership role was invoked on several occasions, initially internally, as the Alliance 
worked as a forum for dialogue and cooperation among its members to overcome 
past divisions and to cement cooperative practices between the (West) European 
states. This became manifest with the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952, West 
)GTOCP[KPCPF5RCKPKP+PVJGNCVGU0#61CNUQUVCTVGFVQFGƒPGKVU
partner identity along an external dimension as a commitment to a more cooperative 
approach in its relations with the Warsaw Pact. This was expressed in the Harmel 
Report (NATO 1967: paragraph 5), which stated that the way to peace and stability in 
Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of 
FȌVGPVGŨ*QYGXGTKVOWUVDGCEMPQYNGFIGFVJCVVJTQWIJQWVVJG%QNF9CTVJGGZVGTPCN
FKOGPUKQPQHVJGŧRCTVPGTKFGPVKV[ŨYCUUGEQPFCT[VQKVUKPVGTPCNFKOGPUKQPCPFVJCV
QXGTCNN RTKOCE[ YCU EQPUKUVGPVN[ IKXGP VQ VJG ŧFGHGPUG CNNKCPEG KFGPVKV[Ũ 
(NQEMJCTV
2015). Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance was able to shift from a focus 
on collective defense to cooperative security, in the process giving greater prominence 
to the partner identity, whilst the defense alliance identity was afforded a lesser role. 
6JG TGDCNCPEKPI QH VJG VYQ KFGPVKVKGU CPF TQNGU ICXG TKUG VQ 0#61ŨU GZVGPUKXG
partnership activities and enlargement process from the mid-1990s onwards. 
In this way, having three pillars (rather than just one or two) has 
contributed to NATOs remarkable ability to adapt to changes 
in the strategic environment and is therefore an attribute that 
should be valued and safeguarded.
+VKUKORQTVCPVVQPQVGVJCVJCF0#61ŧLWUVŨDGGPCFGHGPUGCNNKCPEGKVYQWNFJCXGJCF
NKVVNG TCKUQPFŨȍVTG KP VJGPGYRQUV%QNF9CTGPXKTQPOGPVCPFYQWNFRTQDCDN[JCXG
disappeared along with the Cold War. However, there was probably also some doubt 
that the partnership identity and the severely reduced role of the defense alliance 
KFGPVKV[YQWNFDGCFGSWCVGVQUWUVCKPVJG#NNKCPEGCUCUKIPKƒECPVUGEWTKV[CEVQT6JG
concern was that the primarily political nature of the partnership identity would be 
KPUWHƒEKGPVVQUWUVCKPCP#NNKCPEGDCUGFEJKGHN[QPOKNKVCT[EQORGVGPEGU#VVJGUCOG
time, the strategic environment of the early 1990s was (much like today) characterized 
D[CPCTEJQHCEVWCNQTRQVGPVKCNETKUKUCPFKPUVCDKNKV[VQ0#61ŨUGCUVCPFUQWVJYJKEJ
seemed to call for NATO to take on a (military) role in crisis management. As the 
tragedy in Yugoslavia deepened whilst NATO stood on the side-lines without an 
obvious role but with plenty of military hardware and strategic planning expertise, the 
idea that it should take on a crisis management role soon became an incontestable 
OCZKOVJCV0#61JCFVQGKVJGTIQŧQWVQHCTGCŨQTŧQWVQHDWUKPGUUŨ5KPEGVJGP0#61
has effectively acquired a third identity as a security institution that is able to engage 
in crisis management and peacekeeping situations when called on to do so. 
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The Alliance was called on more times than anticipated, and in situations that turned 
out to be far more demanding than expected. Moreover, the role was never fully 
accepted by the new member states, whose primary reason for joining NATO in the 
ƒTUV RNCEG YCU VJCV VJG[ XKGYGF 0#61 CU C FGHGPUG CNNKCPEG PQV CU VJG CXQYGFN[
expeditionary crisis management actor it became on the eve of the new eastern 
members joining the Alliance in 1999. It is well known that the Alliance and its partners 
have been engaged in a number of crisis management operations mainly in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, and that the outcome of these operations remains an 
issue surrounded by some dispute. As a result some member states are now eager to 
TGFWEG0#61ŨUETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVCEVKXKVKGUCPFVJGUVCVWUQHETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVCU
a core task. However, the idea that NATO can abandon its commitment to crisis 
management at a time of growing instability on its southern flank seems untenable. 
To be sure, the move into a crisis management role was remarkable because, while 
NATO clearly was born as an organization resting on the twin pillars of power and 
partnership, the Washington Treaty makes no particular provisions for a role in crisis 
OCPCIGOGPV CPF UQECNNGF ŧQWVQH CTGCŨ QRGTCVKQPU *QYGXGT VJG D[ PQY NQPI
standing practice of engagement in crisis management operations and the clear 
GZRGEVCVKQPQPVJGRCTVQHVJG7PKVGF5VCVGUVJCV'WTQRGCP0#61CNNKGUŧFQVJGKTRCTVŨ
in non-Article Five contingencies in the vicinity of Europe in return for continued Article 
Five commitment from the United States makes crisis management an integral part 
of the Alliance as both a practical role and an additional identity. As the United States 
EQPVKPWGU KVU ŧTGDCNCPEKPIŨ VQYCTFU #UKC VJG GZRGEVCVKQP VJCV 0#61ŨU 'WTQRGCP
members take on a leading role in crisis management contingencies in the vicinity of 
Europe is likely to become more pronounced.
In the emerging strategic environment, it is clear that the  
dramatic downturn in the relationship with Russia calls for  
the Alliance to bring the old defence alliance identity forward 
again and to enhance the capabilities required for such a role.
Over the years, the dual, and since the 1990s, the triple character of the Alliance has 
IKXGPTKUGVQUQOGRGTRNGZKV[CPFCRRCTGPVEQPVTCFKEVKQPU KP0#61ŨUOWNVKRTQPIGF
approach to security, which has at times led to uncertainty about its primary role. 
However, arguably it is precisely such ambiguity and uncertainty that is the lifeblood 
of an Alliance that rests on assumptions which only barely hang together logically, 
and which can never be proven until the day they are called for. The promise contained 
in Article Five hinges on trust and political will rather than on certainty and proven 
capability. That has always been the case and will undoubtedly remain so in the future, 
although it seems unlikely that it is this uncertainty that the proponents of the back to 
DCUKEUUVTCVGI[ŨJCXGKPOKPF6JGDGPGƒVQHVJGVJTGGEQTGVCUMUKUVJCVVJG#NNKCPEG
has been able to focus on one or two of them at any one time depending on the 
URGEKƒEUGEWTKV[EJCNNGPIGUQHVJGVKOGCPFVQCFLWUVVJGKTDCNCPEGYKVJTGNCVKXGGCUG
This is essentially what NATO continues to do as the Wales Summit adjusted the 
balance back towards a more prominent role for collective defence. In this way, having 
VJTGGRKNNCTU
TCVJGTVJCPLWUVQPGQTVYQJCUEQPVTKDWVGFVQ0#61ŨUTGOCTMCDNGCDKNKV[
to adapt to changes in the strategic environment and is therefore an attribute that 
should be valued and safeguarded. 
The fact that NATO rests on three pillars offers the Alliance an unusual degree of 
simultaneous stability and flexibility that may well be an important reason for its 
endurance. Most military alliances in history have only lasted for as long as a clear 
and imminent danger was present. Moreover, in most alliances throughout history, 
alliance members feared each other almost as much as they feared the enemy (Thies, 
2009: 87). NATO is special because it is an alliance of democracies that do not fear 
each other, and it rests on practices that do not challenge the many ambiguities 
KPJGTGPVYKVJKPKVCPFŤCHCEVQTVJCVKUQHVGPQXGTNQQMGFŤDGECWUGKVKUCDNGVQUYKVEJ
from one role and identity to another. In this way, during the Cold War NATO focused 
almost exclusively on collective defence, whereas the post-Cold War period has been 
EJCTCEVGTK\GF D[ C UJCTGF HQEWU QP EQQRGTCVKXG UGEWTKV[ VJTQWIJ 0#61ŨU ITQYKPI
EKTENG QH RCTVPGTUJKRU CPF KPETGCUKPIN[ Ť VJQWIJ CV VKOGU TGNWEVCPVN[ Ť QP ETKUKU
management through its operations. 
In the emerging strategic environment, it is clear that the dramatic downturn in the 
TGNCVKQPUJKRYKVJ4WUUKCECNNUHQTVJG#NNKCPEGVQDTKPIVJGŧQNFŨFGHGPEGCNNKCPEGKFGPVKV[Ũ
forward again and to enhance the capabilities required for such a role. However, it is 
CNUQVJGECUGVJCVVJGUGEWTKV[EJCNNGPIGUGOGTIKPIVQVJGUQWVJCPFHWTVJGTCƒGNF
ECPPQVDGOGVD[C TQNGCUCFGHGPUGCNNKCPEGDWVYKNN EQPVKPWG VQ TGSWKTG0#61ŨU
readiness to act in a crisis management and expeditionary capacity. Moreover, the 
changed relationship with Russia, the diminished prospects of membership for states 
VJCVCTGWPNKMGN[VQHWNƒN0#61ŨUOGODGTUJKRETKVGTKCCPFVJGHWPFCOGPVCNN[EJCPIGF
RQNKVKECNUVTWEVWTGUKPOCP[QH0#61ŨUEWTTGPVRCTVPGTUKPVJG/KFFNG'CUVYKNNTGSWKTG
a fundamental rethink of its partnership policy, though not a diminished role for 
EQQRGTCVKXGUGEWTKV[QTHQT0#61ŨURCTVPGTUJKRKFGPVKV[
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6JGUWIIGUVKQPVJCV0#61UJQWNFIQŧDCEMVQDCUKEUŨVJGTGHQTGPQVQPN[IQGUVQVJG
heart of the structure of the Alliance as an institution resting on three pillars and which 
reaches further than simply challenging the validity of the current Strategic Concept. 
It is also a suggestion that flies in the face of the challenges arising from the emerging 
UVTCVGIKEGPXKTQPOGPVCPFYJKEJYQWNFDGNKMGN[VQFKOKPKUJ0#61ŨUCDKNKV[VQCFCRV
and would undermine the very foundations that have contributed to its continued 
relevance across very different strategic environments for more than six decades. In 
VJGPGYUVTCVGIKEGPXKTQPOGPV#NNKCPEGEQJGUKQPYKNNDGRCTCOQWPVCPFCNNQH0#61ŨU
three core tasks will be needed. It is therefore important to reiterate the need for all 
NATO members to accept that one core task cannot be privileged over another, and 
that it is the co-existence of all three core tasks that has enabled the Alliance to endure 
ŤPQYKPVQKVUUGXGPVJFGECFG2GTOCPGPVN[FQYPITCFKPIQPGQTVJGQVJGTQHVJGVJTGG
core tasks is likely to undermine the strength and stability of the Alliance.
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STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
IN A CHANGING WORLD
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NATO has always moved forward through persuasion and negotiation to forge the 
necessary consensus. Although the process has often been frustratingly cumbersome, 
CU5GETGVCT[)GPGTCN5VQNVGPDGTIJCURQKPVGFQWV0#61ŨUITGCVGUVUVTGPIVJOC[YGNN
be its ability to (eventually) adapt.4 However, to be able to undertake the right 
CFCRVCVKQP JKPIGU ETKVKECNN[ QP JCXKPI UWHƒEKGPV UVTCVGIKE CPCN[UKU ECRCDKNKVKGU CPF
being able to prioritise the challenges of different changes. Yet, these are precisely the 
skills the Alliance is less adept at. In the current situation, few will disagree that the 
world is changing, but it is less clear how it is changing or what the consequences will 
DG6JGFTCOCVKEGXGPVUQHENGCTN[JGTCNFGFOCLQTEJCPIGKP0#61ŨUKOOGFKCVG
strategic environment on its eastern and southern borders. However, what if these 
changes are only part of a much larger structural change that is every bit as important 
as the end of the Cold War? What if we are currently living through systemic 
transformation and the end of the global reach of the rule-based, liberal international 
order? What if NATO is currently busy responding to the symptoms of large-scale 
systemic change, but in the process fails to address the underlying root causes of the 
EJCNNGPIGUGOGTIKPIQP0#61ŨUGCUVGTPCPFUQWVJGTPDQTFGTU!
The dramatic events of 2014 clearly heralded major change in 
NATOs immediate strategic environment on its eastern and 
southern borders.
6JGRTQDNGOKUVJCVGXGPVJQWIJ0#61JCUCEEGUUVQUKIPKƒECPVUVTCVGIKECPCN[UKU
capabilities within its own organization, its member states and some of its agencies, 
Ť0#61KUQHVGPJCORGTGFKPKVUCDKNKV[VQTGURQPFKPVJGQRVKOCNYC[+PCPQTICPK\CVKQP
where the practical reality is that decisions are taken according to what is politically 
possible rather than on the basis of what is strategically necessary long term forecasts 
are often ignored. It is no coincidence that the history of the development of the 
#NNKCPEGKUCNUQCJKUVQT[QHETKUGUDGECWUG0#61ŨUCDKNKV[VQCFCRVJCUCNYC[UDGGP
prompted by a sense of urgency. When the change in the strategic environment has 
been imperceptible or intangible, the ability of the Alliance to respond has been less 
remarkable. In an alliance of 28 sovereign states, each with its own distinct security 
priorities, such a pattern is of course to be expected, and it is fully recognized that the 
Alliance is structurally predetermined to take decisions that reflect the lowest common 
denominator, rather than bold and forward-looking initiatives in anticipation of change 
that has not yet happened. Yet the emerging systemic change calls for a new approach 
CPF C TGPGYGF GORJCUKU QP 0#61ŨU UVTCVGIKE CPCN[UKU ECRCDKNKVKGU CU YGNN CU KVU
ECRCEKV[VQHQTIGCEQPUGPUWUQPHCTTGCEJKPIVTCPUHQTOCVKQPUDGHQTGVJGŧJGNRŨQHC
clear and unambiguous crisis might concentrate the mind. 
At the 2015 Munich Security Conference (MSC), it was clear that the concerns about 
the future of the current order that had been percolating for some time in scholarly 
circles had also reached the top of the transatlantic policy community. The growing 
concerns about the future of the existing order were clearly expressed in the 
conference theme, Collapsing Order, Reluctant Guardians (Munich Security 
Conference, 2015). The conference seemed to mark an important turning point in how 
policy circles view the changes taking place in the international order by implicitly 
acknowledging that the combination of shifting power in the international system and 
the declining attractiveness of the liberal principles supporting the order were 
undermining the essential assumptions that had informed policy for more than six 
decades.  Moreover, the same concerns had been expressed for some time by several 
strategic foresight establishments, all of which agree that major transformation is 
taking place with even more change to come.56JGKTƒPFKPIUEQPEWTVJCVPQVQPN[KU
change surely on its way but also that the changes taking place in the European and 
in the global strategic security environment are truly transformational and may render 
the existing institutional landscape unrecognizable within just a couple of decades. 
CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC INVIRONMENT:
Q Changes in the power structure of the international system, as new powers rise 
or (re)-emerge and as Western powers struggle with their own economic, political 
and societal challenges
Q Changes in the principles of how to maintain order in the international system, as 
long-established (liberal) values and (Western) practices are challenged and losing 
some of their magnetism
Q Changes in the institutional architecture, as (Western) multilateral institutions face 
FGETGCUKPINGXGNUQHNGIKVKOCE[CPFGHƒEKGPE[CPFCUPGYCNVGTPCVKXGKPUVKVWVKQPCN
structures are established
Q Changes in domestic structures, as some non-Western societies reject the (West-
ern) democratic model and the idea that there is just one route to modernity and 
the good life   
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In addition, new (and re-emerging old) security challenges related to vulnerabilities in 
critical infrastructures such as in cyber, energy and supply lines and to actual and 
forecasted changes in climate, technology, demographics and migration (NATO, 
2013) look set to test conventional military and security thinking and established 
organizational practices. Moreover, the endurance of the role of the United States as 
a global hegemon is coming into doubt, whilst its attention is increasingly diverted 
towards Asia and to domestic matters. 
Although these issues had been circulating in academic circles for some time, and 
although it had long been accepted that change was taking place, the Munich Security 
Conference constituted a turning point because it articulated explicitly within a highly 
influential political framework the possibility of the collapse of the current international 
order. The delay in fully engaging with these issues may partly have been because 
SWGUVKQPU QH KPVGTPCVKQPCN QTFGT CTG KPGZVTKECDN[ DQWPF WR YKVJ VJG TGNCVGF Ť DWV
RQNKVKECNN[VQZKEŤFGDCVGCDQWVVJGHWVWTGQH#OGTKECPRQYGTGURGEKCNN[VJGSWGUVKQP
of American decline and whether the United States should retrench from its 
commitments or continue to underwrite the existing international order (Bremmer, 
2015). This issue goes straight to the heart of the cohesion of the Alliance and the 
credibility of the American security guarantee. Opening up these issues within an 
Alliance setting is therefore something that is likely to be instinctively dodged.  
The endurance of the role of the United States as a global  
hegemon is coming into doubt, whilst its attention is  
increasingly diverted towards Asia and to domestic matters.
Apart from the ingrained reluctance within the Alliance to discuss issues that could 
bring its cohesion and credibility into question, the ability to fully engage with the 
structural changes facing the Alliance has also been hampered by the nature of the 
change itself. The current situation has been described as an era of compounding 
EQORNGZKV[ŨŤWPFGTUVQQFCUCPGPXKTQPOGPVKPYJKEJEJCNNGPIGUITQYGZRQPGPVKCNN[
rather than simply by addition, as complex trends interact with one another and as 
new security challenges emerge and old ones are reasserted (Smith and Stokes, 
2014). The problem with compounding complexity for NATO is that it points to no 
clear and unambiguous crisis whilst offering plenty of scope for the 28 member states 
to interpret a truly overwhelming array of changes in different ways and to arrive at 
FKXGTIKPIUGEWTKV[RTKQTKVKGU+PCUKVWCVKQPEJCTCEVGTK\GFD[ŧEQORQWPFKPIEQORNGZKV[Ũ
VJG NKPM DGVYGGP [QWPI YGUVGTP /WUNKOU VTCXGNNKPI VQ 5[TKC QT ŧNKVVNG ITGGP OGPŨ KP
Crimea and transformational change in the international order is not easy to 
demonstrate. In this situation it is perhaps not surprising that the Alliance has focused 
KVU CVVGPVKQP QP VJG ENGCT CPF WPCODKIWQWU EJCNNGPIGU QP 0#61ŨU GCUVGTP CPF
southern borders, even if many are fully aware that these challenges may simply be 
symptoms of more fundamental change. 
In a situation characterized by compounding complexity, the 
link between young western Muslims travelling to Syria or  
little green men in Crimea and transformational change in the 
international order is not easy to demonstrate.
0QVYKVJUVCPFKPIVJGFKHƒEWNVKGUKPFGOQPUVTCVKPIVJGEQPPGEVKQPDGVYGGPVJGOCP[
and diverse changes that are taking place in the international environment, and 
FGURKVGVJGTGNWEVCPEGKPRQNKE[EKTENGUVQCFFTGUUGXGPKORNKEKVN[VJGKUUWGQH#OGTKECŨU
declining relative position, by the autumn of 2015 it was undeniable that major change 
was taking place in the international system that could not be ignored even by the 
OQUVCTFGPVDGNKGXGTKP#OGTKECŨUGPFWTKPIRQYGTCPFKPVJGWPKXGTUCNDGPGƒVUQHVJG
liberal order. Apart from the deterioration in the relationship with Russia and the 
continued atrocities committed by new unruly actors such as Daesh, the Charlie 
Hebdo and November attacks in Paris, the persistent crises in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq 
and the escalating crises in Libya, Yemen and the Sahel all served as a reminder of an 
international strategic environment in flux. The gravity of the situation was even more 
apparent in the unfolding tragedy of an unprecedented number of displaced persons 
fleeing violence or poverty. Moreover, the challenge to the values underpinning the 
international order was underscored by the many young western-educated Muslims 
travelling in the opposite direction to those fleeing violence with the intention of 
ƒIJVKPIHQT&CGUJ
&GURKVG0#61ŨUUVTWEVWTCN KPCDKNKV[ VQGPICIGYKVJ HWVWTGEJCPIGYKVJQWVCPCEVWCN
ETKUKU ŧUPCRRKPICV VJGJGGNUŨQHFGEKUKQPOCMGTU VJG#NNKCPEGCEVWCNN[JCUDQVJCP
internal capacity for strategic analysis and access to externally derived strategic 
foresight analysis. Moreover, the establishment of the Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT) in 2003 furnished the Alliance with its own strategic foresight analysis division, 
which produces regular reports on strategic change and its implications such as the 
Multiple Futures Project6 and the Strategic Foresight Analysis Report for 2013 (NATO, 
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2013). The latter serves as the foundation for future Alliance operations and for how 
0#61UJQWNFGZGEWVG KVU VJTGGEQTG VCUMUFGƒPGF KP VJG5VTCVGIKE%QPEGRV 
0#61
9KVJKP0#61JGCFSWCTVGTUVJGITQYKPITGEQIPKVKQPQH0#61ŨUPGGFVQGPUWTG
that the Alliance has an enhanced Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC) to monitor and 
anticipate international developments that could affect Alliance security led recently 
to the re-establishment of the Political Committee (PC) to discuss issues of overall 
strategic importance. Among other things, the PC discusses internally produced 
Strategic Analysis Capability papers produced by the Emerging Security Challenges 
&KXKUKQPQPURGEKƒEQRGTCVKQPCNCPFUVTCVGIKEKUUWGU+PFGGFCUK\CDNGRTQRQTVKQPQH
0#61ŨU KPVGTPCVKQPCN UVCHH CTG FG HCEVQ GPICIGF KP UVTCVGIKE CPCN[UKU VJTQWIJ VJG
#NNKCPEGŨU EQPVKPWQWU FGHGPUG RNCPPKPI RTQEGUUGU 0GXGTVJGNGUU FGURKVG VJG
considerable resources spent on strategic analysis, the general feeling within the 
QTICPK\CVKQPUGGOUVQDGVJCVVJG#NNKCPEGŧKUPQVXGT[IQQFCVKVŨQTVJCVVJGRTQEGUU
ŧNCEMU RQNKVKECN IWKFCPEGŨ 6JG EQPEGTP CDQWV UKIPKƒECPV EJCPIG KP VJG UVTCVGIKE
GPXKTQPOGPV KU GXKFGPEGF D[ 0#61ŨU CFQRVKQP QH C PGY %QORTGJGPUKXG 2QNKVKECN
)WKFCPEG 
%2) FQEWOGPV 6JG FQEWOGPV KU ENCUUKƒGF UQ KVU XCNWG KU FKHƒEWNV VQ
assess, but its adoption is a clear indication that NATO Headquarters takes the 
prospect of strategic change seriously.7
NATO and the EU both have to adapt to the strategic change, 
and both organizations are in the process of preparing major 
strategic policy decisions.
NATO and the EU both have to adapt to the strategic change, and both organizations 
are in the process of preparing major strategic policy decisions. The EU, under the 
leadership of High Representative Frederica Mogherini, is currently working on 
formulating a new Global Security Strategy to replace the document agreed in 2003. 
A report on the state of the strategic environment will be presented at the June 2016 
European Council meeting, just a few weeks before the NATO Warsaw Summit. It 
goes without saying that, in an ideal world, the two organizations (which have 22 
member states in common) should coordinate their strategic analyses and ensure 
that at the minimum they start from the same premise regarding what kind of global 
QTFGTKUGOGTIKPI*QYGXGTVJKUKUGCUKGTUCKFVJCPFQPGDGECWUGPQVQPN[KUVJG'7Ť
NATO relationship constrained by well-known political blockages, but it is also not 
certain that the two organizations, despite their considerable overlap, will arrive at the 
same conclusions on the nature of the emerging global strategic environment. 
In addition to utilizing their extensive access to internal and externally derived strategic 
analysis, the two organizations could also turn to the by now extensive scholarly 
literature on the subject. However, although there is widespread agreement on the 
changes taking place, there is less agreement on their ranking and importance or on 
what kind of international order is likely to result from the current complex changes. 
The challenges of encouraging the two organizations to proceed from a common 
starting point are therefore considerable. The next section will turn to (considering the 
voluminous literature available) a brief review of the literature on the emerging 
KPVGTPCVKQPCNQTFGTYJKEJOC[HQTOCWUGHWNUVCTVKPIRQKPVHQTVJGVYQQTICPK\CVKQPUŨ
processes of strategic analysis.
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NARRATIVES ABOUT 
THE COMING INTERNATIONAL ORDER
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The current literature can usefully be divided into three different narratives on the 
coming international order: one that harks back to the past, one that seeks to extend 
the present into the future, and one that looks to a profoundly different future. The 




policy circles. It is also the simplest of the three narratives, as it suggests that we are 
currently witnessing a return to multipolarity because new powers are rising. In its 
most widely cited form it is based on the logic that, as some powers rise, the unipolar 
moment will be over (Krauthammer, 1990) and will be replaced with either a return to 
bipolarity or, more likely, a shift to global multipolarity (Blagden, 2015). Some versions 
QH VJG PCTTCVKXG HQTGUGG C ŧRQUV#OGTKECP YQTNFŨ KP YJKEJ ŧVJG TKUG QH VJG TGUVŨ
fundamentally alters the structure of the international system (Zakaria, 2008). The 
narrative emphasizes military and economic power, and stresses that military power 
rests on economic strength (Jacques, 2009), which leads to the persuasive argument 
that as rising powers increase their economic strength, increases in their military 
power will follow. The narrative is persuasive because it can be backed up with an 
array of empirical evidence, it has clear historical precedents, and it is easy to convey 
to a broader audience. As a result it has gained considerable traction in both the 
popular media and within some policy circles. 
However, the narrative is split on the question of the position of the United States in 
VJG EQOKPI KPVGTPCVKQPCN U[UVGO Ť GURGEKCNN[ KH VJG 7PKVGF 5VCVGU YKNN DG CDNG VQ
maintain its hegemonic position by balancing itself against rising powers such as 
China. Logically a multipolar narrative implies the end of hegemony, which is why 
many of its proponents are reluctant to characterize the coming order as multipolar, 
but do emphasize balance of power dynamics. What is at issue is that a return to 
OWNVKRQNCTKV[UWIIGUVU#OGTKECPFGENKPGŤCRQUKVKQPVJCVOQUV#OGTKECP+4UEJQNCTU
working within a balance-of-power perspective are unwilling to take. However, 
although there is a reluctance to accept the logical consequence of a return of 
multipolarity, proponents of the narrative accept the necessity of balance-of-power 
RQNKVKEUCPFCITGGVJCVVJG9GUVŤGURGEKCNN[VJG7PKVGF5VCVGUŤOWUVCEVPQYVQ
cement its position for the future.8 In doing so, they accept that the United States 
should certainly think twice before using force, especially where key national interests 
are not at stake, but they also maintain that diplomacy must always be backed with 
force (Nau, 2013). Proponents of this narrative foresee a return to past practices of 




The second narrative accepts that the rise of new powers will affect the coming 
international order, but it vehemently rejects the idea that the United States is in 
decline or that the coming order will represent a return to multipolarity. Proponents of 
the multi-partner narrative stress that America is an enduring power, but they also 
maintain that the United States shares more interests with other powers than the 
multipolar narrative suggests (Jones, 2014: 2). In policy circles this narrative was 
most clearly articulated by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as a move to 
GUVCDNKUJCŧEQQRGTCVKXGCTEJKVGEVWTGŨNGCFKPIVQCŧOWNVKRCTVPGTYQTNFŨTCVJGTVJCPC
ŧOWNVKRQNCTYQTNFŨ9 
6JGUGEQPFPCTTCVKXG KUOQTGQRVKOKUVKE VJCP VJG ŧOWNVKRQNCTPCTTCVKXGŨ +VDCUGU KVU
optimism on the belief that the current liberal order is highly resilient, able to adapt, 
and open and easy to join by new rising powers that wish to align themselves with the 
current liberal order (Ikenberry, 2011). In this view, change is certainly envisaged and 
is based on optimism that a reformed version of the current order can be maintained 
in an altered strategic environment and that the soft power of its founding (liberal) 
ideas will continue to act as a magnet to emerging democratic powers. In the multi-
RCTVPGT PCTTCVKXGŨ #PPG/CTKG 5NCWIJVGTŨU ŧPGVYQTMGF YQTNFŨ KU YJCV RQNKE[OCMGTU
should strive towards to produce a system of global governance that institutionalizes 
EQQRGTCVKQPCPFEQPVCKPUEQPHNKEVUWHƒEKGPVN[UWEJVJCVCNNPCVKQPUCPFVJGKTRGQRNGU
may achieve greater peace and prosperity and reach minimum standards of human 
FKIPKV[
5NCWIJVGT6JG ŧOWNVKRCTVPGTPCTTCVKXGŨ VJGTGHQTGUGGMUVQGZVGPF
the present into the future, although it also accepts the necessity of repairing those 
aspects of the liberal order that are currently acknowledged to be in crisis and that 
have clearly failed to deliver on the liberal promise of freedom and prosperity. Urgent 
reform of the existing multilateral institutions is therefore needed, and the West needs 
to address expeditiously the persistent domestic economic and political ills that 
FGVTCEVHTQOVJGCRRGCNCPFGHƒEKGPE[QHVJGNKDGTCNQTFGT
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A MULTI-ORDER FUTURE
The third narrative is much more diverse than the two previous narratives and includes 
both optimistic and pessimistic versions. I call it the multi-order narrative, but it could 
CNUQDGECNNGFCŧFGEGPVGTGFHWVWTGŨQTCŧPQQPGŨUHWVWTGŨ1PGQHVJGOQUVRTQOKPGPV
GZCORNGUQHVJKUPCTTCVKXGKU%JCTNGU-WREJCPŨUŧ0Q1PGŨU9QTNFŨKPYJKEJ-WREJCP




any country, region or model will dominate the world of the future. The emergent 
international system will be populated by numerous power centers at different stages 
QPVJGKTYC[VQOWNVKRNGXGTUKQPUQHOQFGTPKV[CPFUQYKNNŧDGNQPIŨVQPQQPGKPRCTVKEWNCT

-WREJCP   6JG EJCNNGPIG KP ŧPQ QPGŨU YQTNFŨ YKNN DG VQ GUVCDNKUJ C INQDCN
consensus between different power centers (or orders) each adhering to their 
particular principles and practices and pursuing their particular vision of order and the 
good life. Establishing a consensus on the fundamental terms of a new order and 
managing a peaceful transformation towards it will be the main challenge for the 
years to come. 
Establishing a consensus on the fundamental terms of a new 
order and managing a peaceful transformation towards it will be 
the main challenge for the years to come.
Where Kupchan emphasizes emerging differences, Buzan and Lawson point out that, 
while power is admittedly becoming more diffuse, nearly all states now adhere to a 
form of capitalism (Buzan and Lawson, 2015). However, despite the growing 
convergence in the economic sphere, they acknowledge the existence of a wide span 
of governance structures, suggesting that the challenge ahead is how to manage 
relations between diverse modes of capitalist governance in a system that can best 
DG FGUETKDGF CU ŧFGEGPVGTGF INQDCNKUOŨ KP YJKEJ PQ UKPING RQYGT Ť QT ENWUVGT QH
RQYGTUŤKURTGGOKPGPV
$W\CPCPF.CYUQP$W\CPCPF.CYUQPUVTGUUHQWT
principles of decentered globalism: global non-hegemony, responsible great powers, 
regionalization alongside globalization, and common security being based on shared 
fates. Provided that these four principles can be adhered to, which the authors 
acknowledge is not without question, a new international society based on the 
principles of decentered globalism could offer the prospect of managing competition 
between integrated but diverse models of political economy (Buzan and Lawson, 
2015: 303).   
The perspectives in the multi-order narrative have in common that they foresee the 
replacement of American/Western hegemony with a more de-centered, polycentric or 
diverse system and acceptance that the US in particular and the West more generally 
will need to get used to the fact that the vision of the universalization of liberal values 
is wishful thinking. They see an emerging global order characterized by diversity and 
diffusion of power, of crisscrossing and overlapping multiple forms of relationships, of 
many different forms of domestic governance, organizational practices and 
institutional architectures. The multi-order narrative agrees with the multi-partner 
perspective that the challenge ahead will be to facilitate global cooperation to address 
collective security problems such as climate change, crime, trade, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), migration and arms control (Buzan, 2012: 46), 
but they do not share the optimism that such cooperation can be forged according to 
9GUVGTPRTKPEKRNGUPQTVJCVTKUKPIRQYGTUŤGKVJGTFGOQETCVKEQTCWVQETCVKEŤECPDG
enticed into the current liberal order. 
The challenge will be to establish dialogue and cooperation 
across these new dividing lines. This is the essential task that 
NATO must now address.
These three narratives are, of course, ideal types that are unlikely to materialize in the 
exact form outlined here. However, each captures important qualities of the changes 
CPF EJCNNGPIGU VJCV CTG NKMGN[ VQ HCEG RQNKE[OCMGTU KP VJG ƒTUV SWCTVGT QH VJG UV
EGPVWT[CPFVJG[GCEJRQKPVVQCRNCWUKDNGHWVWTG6JKUTGRQTVƒPFUVJCVVJGOWNVKQTFGT
future seems to be the most accurate and realistic one because it incorporates the 
GNGOGPVUQHVJGƒTUVVYQPCTTCVKXGUYJKNGCFFKPIQVJGTCUUWORVKQPUVJCVUGGOOQTG
realistic for the emerging strategic environment. In relation to the multipolar narrative 
CPFKVUHQEWUQPVJGDCNCPEGQHRQYGTVJGOWNVKQTFGTPCTTCVKXGJCUVJGDGPGƒVQHPQV
focusing so exclusively on material factors, but includes an understanding that the 
primacy of the Western liberal set of ideas is no longer shared with a growing number 
of increasingly important and powerful actors in the international system. In relation 
to the multi-partner narrative, the multi-order narrative shares the idea that partnership, 
dialogue and cooperation will be necessary elements of the coming order, but it does 
not share the optimism that in the future relationships can be based on the continuation 
of western ideological hegemony. What seems more likely is that several different 
international orders will coexist, each characterized by different principles, institutions 
and structures of domestic governance. The challenge will be to establish dialogue 
and cooperation across these new dividing lines. This is the essential task that NATO 
must now address. 
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ADAPTING TO A MULTI-ORDER FUTURE
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+V KUCNYC[UGCUKGTVQTGCEVVQCVCPIKDNGETKUKUVJCPVQCFCRVVQCRTQLGEVGFŤCPF
FKURWVGFŤHWVWTGUWEJCUVJGVJTGGXGTUKQPUQWVNKPGFJGTG*QYGXGTKVOC[PQYDG
time to accept that the three possible futures are not of equal status and that 
elements of the multi-order future is already part of the present strategic reality. In 
other words, it is time to base policy and strategic planning on the strategic 
environment as it really is, rather than on what policy makers would prefer it to be. 
Such a move would require acceptance that, rather than the events of the last 
couple of years questioning the international order, it may be that events such as the 
crisis in Ukraine, the emergence of IS and the establishment of new alternative 
institutions like the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) represent 
concrete manifestations of the arrival of the multi-order future. 
#EEGRVKPIVJGCTTKXCNQHCFGEGPVGTGFYQTNFQT-WREJCPŨU0Q1PGŨU9QTNFQTO[
RTGHGTTGF PCOG Ť C OWNVKQTFGT YQTNF Ť TGSWKTGU CEEGRVCPEG VJCV VJG NKDGTCN
international order established after the end of the Second World War no longer has 
a universal claim to order-making on a global scale. This was, of course, also the 
case during the Cold War, where two ideologically opposed orders (the Soviet 
communist order and the Western liberal order) co-existed in a confrontational 
relationship with very few open lines of communication and cooperation between 
them.10 However, it would be a mistake to assume that a multi-order world would be 
similar to the bipolar world of the Cold War, or for that matter that it would be similar 
to the multipolar world that went before it, although it has similarities with both. 
It is time to base policy and strategic planning on the strategic 
environment as it really is, rather than on what policy makers 
would prefer it to be.
The multi-order world shares with the bipolar world of the Cold War the fact that 
FKHHGTGPV KPVGTPCVKQPCN QTFGTU EQGZKUV CPF VJCV GCEJ KU DCUGF QP KVU QYP URGEKƒE
RTKPEKRNGU KPUVKVWVKQPUCPFUVTWEVWTGUQHFQOGUVKEIQXGTPCPEGCPFVJCVCURGEKƒE
power relationship between them influences their room of manoeuvre. The multi-
order world shares with the multipolar world the fact that there is likely to be more 
than two power centres, but it is different from the multipolar world of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries because in the multipolar world the European powers 
shared a roughly similar culture and shared basic principles about how to maintain 
order between them. Until the rise of Fascism and Nazism they also appeared to 
share a (roughly) similar developmental path towards governance structures based 
on liberal enlightenment principles and to share an institutional framework, though 
an immature one, for interstate cooperation. 
In a multi-order world, partnerships will acquire a more  
prominent position, albeit in a more challenging environment 
for establishing politically acceptable partnerships.
The international systems depicted in Figure 1 are different because they differ in 
VJGKTEQPUVKVWVKXGGNGOGPVUŤJGTGEQPEGRVWCNK\GFCURQYGTRTKPEKRNGUKPUVKVWVKQPU
and domestic governance structures. Moreover, as suggested by Alexander Wendt 
OQTGVJCPVYGPV[[GCTUCIQŧCPCTEJ[KUYJCVUVCVGUOCMGQHKVŨ
9GPFV6JWU
whether the coming multi-order world turns out to be conflictual, cooperative or 
competitive will very much depend on the cultures of anarchy that develop through 
political practice. This is to a large extent where NATO might be able to play a 
UKIPKƒECPVTQNGCUVJG#NNKCPEGOC[EQPVTKDWVGVQYCTFUGUVCDNKUJKPIRTCEVKEGUVJCV
are conducive to a cooperative multi-order world, rather than a competitive or 
conflictual multi-order world. In a multi-order world, however, the challenge is that, 
although relations between the different orders are likely to be harder to establish 
and sustain, there is no alternative to having relationships across many forms of 
dividing lines because globalization, WMD proliferation, international terrorism, 
environmental degradation and climate change, along with many other issues, will 
continue to demand the attention of policy-makers without offering any single-actor 
based solutions. In other words, in a multi-order world, partnerships will acquire a 
more prominent position, albeit in a more challenging environment for establishing 
RQNKVKECNN[CEEGRVCDNGRCTVPGTUJKRUŨ
The difference between the international systems is outlined in Figure 1, where the 
colours of individual triangles signify similarity or difference in power, principles, 
institutions and domestic governance structures. The arrows between the different 
QTFGTUUKIPKH[OWNVKRNGHQTOUQHTGNCVKQPUJKRUYJKEJYKNNDGYJCVKUNKMGN[VQFGƒPG
VJGŧEWNVWTGQHCPCTEJ[Ũ
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In the coming multi-order world, the challenge will be to maintain a global cooperative 
institutional framework for meeting common global problems and challenges, 
whilst at the same time accepting that each individual order is likely to develop its 
QYPQTFGTURGEKƒEKPUVKVWVKQPUHQTOGGVKPIQTFGTURGEKƒEEJCNNGPIGUCPFECRVWTKPI
opportunities. In such an international system, the emphasis will be on exploring the 




multi-order world will be characterized by both economic and military competition 
between old and emerging power centres, and that some emerging orders are likely 
to be dysfunctional and characterized by high levels of conflict, poverty and 
KPUVCDKNKV[YJKEJNKMGN[YKNNJCXGCUKIPKƒECPVKORCEVQPQVJGTQTFGTUKPVJGU[UVGO
6JGEWTTGPVRGTEGRVKQPQHŧEQORQWPFKPIEQORNGZKV[ŨCTKUGUHTQOVJGPGYCPFOQTG
complex multi-order world and an increasing lack of legitimacy of (western) 
multilateral institutions among emerging powers, coupled with a growing frustration 
with the inability of existing institutions to meet the many challenges they face and 
to undertake reform (Vestergaard and Wade, 2014).
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NATOS ADAPTATION TO THE 
COMING MULTI-ORDER WORLD
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If the multi-order narrative becomes the starting point accepted by NATO, and indeed 
the EU, this will clearly have major policy implications for both organizations, and in 
VJGECUGQH0#61KVKUNKMGN[VQTGSWKTGUKIPKƒECPVCFCRVCVKQPOGCUWTGUKPCNNVJTGGQH
its core tasks. The Alliance can, of course, only hope to play a limited role in the 
GOGTIKPIOWNVKQTFGTYQTNFDWVTGEQIPKUKPICUCƒTUVUVGRVJGOWNVKQTFGTEJCTCEVGTQH
the emerging strategic environment may help it adjust each of its three core tasks in 
ways that follow logically from the actual strategic environment. The following section 
will outline the adaptation measures that will be necessary for NATO to meet the 
challenges of a multi-order world.
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
The sense of urgency generated by the dramatic downturn in the relationship with 
Russia and by the sudden rise of Daesh paved the way for the decisions taken at the 
2014 Wales Summit. As outlined in Box 2, the decisions at that summit included a 
pledge by all members to move towards the two percent defence expenditure goal 
YKVJKP C FGECFG CPF VQ NCWPEJ C UGTKGU QH KPKVKCVKXGU FGUKIPGF VQ DQNUVGT 0#61ŨU
readiness and ability to live up to its Article Five commitments. To be sure these were 
necessary initiatives that were long overdue, as shrinking defence budgets over a 
PWODGTQH[GCTUCPFWPEQQTFKPCVGFFGHGPEGEWVUJCFEGTVCKPN[NGHV0#61ŨUEQNNGEVKXG
defence capability severely overstretched. Perhaps a little polemically, one could say 
that Mr Putin has done more to spur  NATO members into taking the necessary action 
VJCPCP[PWODGTQH ŧVJWPFGTURGGEJGUŨD[QWVIQKPIFGHGPEGUGETGVCTKGUUGETGVCT[
generals and other practitioners and analysts in recent years. However, although the 
Wales initiatives are a step in the right direction, there is a danger that some member 
states will see the initiatives as the sum total of what NATO needs to do because they 
are focused on the change in the relationship with Russia and the changed security 
challenge from Daesh, rather than on the overall systemic strategic change outlined 
above. If so, then the damage could be immense and would eventually leave NATO as 
an irrelevant relic of a past international order.
6JG KPVGTEQPPGEVGFPGUU QH 0#61ŨU EJCNNGPIGU CPF VJG FGOCPFU QP KVU CDKNKV[ VQ
muster its collective defence was also demonstrated in the October 2015 incursions 
of Russian combat aircraft into Turkish airspace and the incident in November 2015 
when the Turkish air force shot down a Russian plane. These incidents suggest, as 
0#61ŨUUQWVJGTPOGODGTUCTIWGVJCVVJGKUUWGQHEQNNGEVKXGFGHGPEGWPFGT#TVKENG
Five is not restricted to eastern members. Moreover, they serve to underline the 
importance of cooperation and communication and the necessity for having 
OGCUWTGUKPRNCEGVQDGCDNGVQŧFGEQPHNKEVŨKPCTGCUYJGTGVYQKPFGRGPFGPVCEVQTU
such as Russia and Turkey are operating in the same geographical space. 
In a multi-order world, relationships are likely to be multi-facetted and may range from 
cooperative relations in some issue areas to competitive and even conflictual 
relationships in others. Therefore, in the case of Russia, NATO needs to adopt a two-
pronged approach (much as it did during the Cold War) based on the strengthened 
territorial defence of its eastern members, whilst at the same time also working 
towards (re)-establishing cooperative relations with Russia in areas characterized by 




The decisions that were taken at the Wales Summit are  
VLJQL ✀cDQWDQGWKHLULPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISDUDPRXQWLPSRUWDQFH
but they should not be allowed to stand alone or to dominate 
NATOs own narrative about its strategic adaptation.
9JKNG VJG 9CNGU FGEKUKQPU YGTG ENGCTN[ KORQTVCPV Ť CNDGKV QPN[ CU RCTV QH C YKFGT
strategy necessary both in relation to the immediate challenges in the relationship 
YKVJ4WUUKCCPFCURCTVQH0#61ŨUCFCRVCVKQPVQVJGQXGTCNNEJCPIGUKPVJGUVTCVGIKE
GPXKTQPOGPV Ť VJG #NNKCPEG PGGFU VQ FGEKFG YJGVJGT VJG 9CNGU FGEKUKQPU CTG HCT
reaching enough and, if not, which supplementary decisions need to be taken at the 
up-coming Warsaw Summit. Of these considerations, one of the most urgent (and 
FKHƒEWNVSWGUVKQPUVQDGEQPUKFGTGFKUVJGTGNGXCPEGQHVJGFGVGTTGPEGCPFFGHGPEG
RQUVWTGQHVJG#NNKCPEGKPVJGUKIPKƒECPVN[CNVGTGFUVTCVGIKEGPXKTQPOGPV6JGSWGUVKQPU
to be asked include whether the measures resulting from the implemented RAP really 
CTGUWHƒEKGPVVQFGVGTCVJTGCVVQ0#61ŨUGCUVGTPOGODGTUYJGVJGTVJGFGVGTTGPEG
posture of the Alliance as a whole is suitable for a strategic environment in which 
hybrid threats seem more likely than unambiguous territorial incursions, and whether 
the existing decision-making procedures are adequate for the ambitions of rapid 
response expressed in the RAP.  
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It is ironic that NATO undertook a full review of its deterrence and defense posture 
(DDPR) in 2012 as part of the adaptation to the 2010 Strategic Concept. However, 
CNVJQWIJVJGTGXKGYYCUKPVGPFGFVQCRRTCKUG0#61ŨUFGHGPUGCPFFGVGTTGPEGRQUVWTG
in the new and emerging environment, it failed to address any of the issues that now 
seem so important and concluded that the existing mix of capabilities and the plans 
HQTVJGKTFGXGNQROGPVCTGUQWPFŨ
0#61g6QDGHCKTVJGNCPIWCIGQHVJG
&&24 KU XCIWG GPQWIJ VQ ƒV CNOQUV CP[ UKVWCVKQP JGPEG CV NGCUV CNNQYKPI HQT VJG
possibility of the Alliance developing further and reviewing its defense and deterrence 
posture in light of the recent changes in the European security environment, especially 
contingency plans for ambiguous situations developing in the most vulnerable 
OGODGTUVCVGUPCOGN[VJGVJTGG$CNVKEUVCVGUCPFHQT0#61ŨUPWENGCTRQUVWTG
Nevertheless a considerable gap does seem to exist between the expectations of the 
eastern members for a deterrence posture reminiscent of the deterrence posture of 
the Cold War and the actual availability of hardware and manpower to make such a 
posture credible. Moreover, it is simply not clear how NATO would respond to a 
security situation at a low level which might prompt calls for Article Five protection 
from the Baltic states, but which might not lead other less vulnerable member states 
to agree to invoke Article Five. These questions are already being addressed in NATO, 
CPF CV VJG &GHGPUG /KPKUVGTUŨ /GGVKPI KP ,WPG  VJG #NNKCPEG CITGGF VQ ITCPV
GPJCPEGFCWVJQTKV[VQ0#61ŨU5WRTGOG#NNKGF%QOOCPFGT'WTQRG
5#%'74UQVJCV
5#%'74 YKNN DG CDNG VQ ŧCNGTV UVCIG CPF RTGRCTG QWT VTQQRU VQ DG TGCF[ VQ IQŨ
(Stoltenberg, 2015). Although this move clearly makes sense in terms of the ambition 
for the Spearhead Force to be ready within 48 hours, it does not indicate whether the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) would agree to its release in an ambiguous situation 
GXGP KH 5#%'74 JCF IKXGP VJG KPKVKCN IQCJGCF 5WEJ C ŧOKUOCVEJŨ EQWNF NGCF VQ
increased tensions in the Alliance.
All in all, the Alliance has certainly refocused its attentions to the core task of collective 
defense. The decisions were clearly needed after a long hiatus in attention to the 
#NNKCPEGŨU#TVKENG(KXGEQOOKVOGPVU*QYGXGTCEQPUKFGTCDNGECRCDKNKV[ŤGZRGEVCVKQPU
gap (Hill, 1993) remains in place, as it seems somewhat doubtful whether the 
capabilities necessary to fully honor the commitments expressed in Article Five are 
still available and operational after a quarter of a century of transforming NATO from 
a stationary territorial defense Alliance into a security institution with a mobile and 
expeditionary emphasis. This has, of course, always been the tricky aspect of the 
Article Five commitment, namely that it contains a promise that ultimately hinges on 
political will rather than material capability; but if the material capability is in doubt, 
then so is the promise. During the Cold War, Europeans were not convinced that 
Western Europe could be defended conventionally with more than 350,000 American 
RGTUQPPGNUVCVKQPGFKP9GUV)GTOCP[ŤKHUWEJŧLKVVGT[ŨHGGNKPIUCTGPQYEJCTCEVGTKUVKE
QH0#61ŨUGCUVGTPOGODGTU KVUGGOUWPNKMGN[VJCVVJGRTQURGEVQHC0#61
Rapid Response Force will reassure them. 
Another problem with concentrating on collective defense is that doing so is unlikely 
to contribute to the peaceful transition to a cooperative multi-order world, a political 
aim that NATO could do well to prioritize, including working towards, as the Wales 
Declaration expressed it, (re)-establishing a cooperative and constructive relationship 
YKVJ4WUUKCŨ 
0#61g6JG&GENCTCVKQPSWKVG TKIJVN[UVTGUUGF VJCV VJGUG
CURKTCVKQPUCTGEQPVKPIGPVQPUGGKPICEJCPIGKP4WUUKCŨUCEVKQPUVQFGOQPUVTCVGKVU
compliance with international law and international obligations and responsibilities. 
However, the dilemma is that the more NATO works towards strengthening its 
capability for meeting Article Five contingencies, the more the prospects for Russia 
changing its behavior diminishes, and along with it the prospect for a reasonably 
constructive relationship with Russia. So although the Wales decisions were in many 
ways a welcome initiative that may well have contributed to narrowing the capability 
- expectations gap and thereby contributed to Alliance cohesion, it is unlikely to have 




Although most of the political attention at the Wales Summit was directed towards 
the perceived need to re-establish the collective defense capability of the Alliance in 
TGURQPUGVQ4WUUKCŨUCEVKQPUKP%TKOGCCPFGCUVGTP7MTCKPGVJGUGEQPFEQTGVCUMŤ
ETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVŤYCUCNUQSWKVGRTQOKPGPVCVNGCUVTJGVQTKECNN[6JG&GENCTCVKQP
TGCHƒTOGF VJG EQOOKVOGPV VQ CNN VJTGG EQTG VCUMU CPF TGKVGTCVGF VJCV VJG 4#2
UKOWNVCPGQWUN[ UVTGPIVJGPU EQNNGEVKXG FGHGPUG CPF 0#61ŨU ETKUKU OCPCIGOGPV
ECRCDKNKV[
0#61g+PRCTVKEWNCTVJG9CNGU5WOOKV&GENCTCVKQPGORJCUK\GF
that the RAP complements and boosts the ambitious goals set at the 2012 Chicago 
Summit for the so-called Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, 
trained, exercised and commanded so as to enable them to operate together and with 
RCTVPGTUKPCP[GPXKTQPOGPVŨ
0#61g6JGEQOOKVOGPVVQVJG(QTEGU
initiative was further enhanced through the endorsement of the Partnership 
Interoperability Initiative (PII), which is a commitment to try to ensure that the bonds 
HQTIGFDGVYGGP#NNKCPEGCPFRCTVPGTPCVKQPUŨCTOGFHQTEGUVJTQWIJEQODCVQRGTCVKQPU
in Afghanistan are maintained through the launch of a new Interoperability Platform in 
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which 24 partners have been invited to work with NATO through dialogue and practical 
EQQRGTCVKQP QP KPVGTQRGTCDKNKV[ KUUWGU 
0#61  g $QVJ CTG ENGCTN[ UGGP CU
GNGOGPVUVJCVEQPVTKDWVGVQ0#61ŨUETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVECRCDKNKV[
The Washington perspective maintains that the United States 
should not be the main contributor to crisis management  
situations but should be able to rely on its allies to put  
substantial resources into meeting non-Article Five security 
challenges in Europes own backyard.
6JG NKPM DGVYGGP VJG 4#2 CPF 0#61ŨU ETKUKU OCPCIGOGPV ECRCDKNKV[ YCU HWTVJGT
strengthened at the Wales Summit through the endorsement of the Framework 
Nations Concept (FNC). The FNC is a German proposal aimed to encourage joint 
capability development by clusters of nations and to provide a new impetus for 
multinational cooperation in NATO defense planning (Mattelaer, 2014). It is anticipated 
that the FNC will facilitate enhanced cooperation between the larger member states 
CEVKPICUŧHTCOGYQTMPCVKQPUŨCPFUOCNNGTOGODGTUVJCVOC[PQVQPVJGKTQYPDGCDNG
VQOQWPVURGEKƒEECRCDKNKVKGUDWVYJQOC[DGCDNGVQŧRNWIKPŨVQECRCDKNKVKGUQHHGTGF
by a larger framework nation. Thus Germany acts as a framework nation with nine 
other member states to work systematically together by deepening and intensifying 
cooperation to create a number of multinational projects to address Alliance priority 
CTGCUCETQUUCDTQCFURGEVTWOQHECRCDKNKVKGUŨ
0#61g*QYGXGTKVUJQWNF
be noted that, even though Germany acts as framework nation, any use of the 
FGGRGPGF CPF KPVGPUKƒGF EQQRGTCVKQP YQWNF UVKNN JCXG VQ DG CEEGRVGF D[ VJG
Bundestag, which does put some doubt on the actual availability of the enhanced 
capabilities. Indeed, as suggested by Claudia Major and Christian Mölling (2014), 
FQWDVUCDQWV$GTNKPŨUTGNKCDKNKV[CUCRCTVPGTOC[YGNNDGVJG#EJKNNGUJGGNQHVJGRTQLGEV
Other FN projects include a group of seven allies (Denmark included) with the United 
Kingdom as FN, which have agreed to establish a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a 
rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, 
including high-intensity operations. It is anticipated that the JEF will be operational by 
2018. Other FN groups are in the process of being developed, but at present it seems 
VQQ GCTN[ VQ HWNN[ CUUGUU VJG KORCEV VJG (0% KU NKMGN[ VQ JCXG QP 0#61ŨU ETKUKU
management capability.
The FNC seems to be geared towards addressing the imbalance between contributions 
by European members and the United States and as such is primarily about the 
delicate issue of transatlantic burden-sharing. Although the Summit Declaration does 
not explicitly say so, it is well known that the Washington perspective maintains that 
the United States should not be the main contributor to crisis management situations 
but should be able to rely on its allies to put substantial resources into meeting non-
#TVKENG(KXGUGEWTKV[EJCNNGPIGU KP'WTQRGŨUQYP ŧDCEM[CTFŨ#UUWIIGUVGFD[&GTGM
Chollet (2015), the Obama administration has focused on US contributions being 
FGƒPGFVJTQWIJŧWPKSWGECRCDKNKVKGUŨCPFGZRGEVUCOQTGGSWCNFKUVTKDWVKQPQHNCDQT
with substantial contributions from its European partners. The emerging Washington 
perspective cannot be separated from the changing global strategic environment, 
where the attention of the United States will increasingly be focused on Asia and on 
American domestic issues. It is simply no longer politically viable for American 
VCZRC[GTU VQRC[ VJG NKQPŨUUJCTGQHETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVQP VQRQHWPFGTYTKVKPI VJG
security guarantee expressed in Article Five. The FNC is certainly a step in the right 
direction of addressing the issue of unequal burden-sharing in a practical manner, but 
it is unlikely to fully address the sensitive issue of transatlantic burden-sharing or to 
HWNN[ HCEKNKVCVG VJG VTCPUKVKQP VQ C PGY FKXKUKQP QH NCDQT DGVYGGP 0#61ŨU 'WTQRGCP
members and the United States that is increasingly being called for (Chollet, 2015). 
The good news is that the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated that 
the Obama Administration has no intention of retrenching from 
the European security guarantee.
Indeed, the issues at hand tear at the very heart of the transatlantic relationship. It is 
clear that the transatlantic relationship can no longer be based on starkly unequal 
burden- and risk-sharing. The good news is that the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated 
that the Obama Administration has no intention of retrenching from the European 
security guarantee. This was underlined in June 2014 with the launch of the European 
Reassurance Initiative (ERI), for which Congress appropriated and authorized nearly a 
billion dollars in funding (Brzezinski, 2015). The initiative was designed to demonstrate 
the steadfast commitment of the United States to the security of NATO allies and 
partners in Europe, including an increased American rotational presence on the 
territories of the eastern members, security assistance to countries threatened by 
Russia, and a number of steps to increase the responsiveness of US forces to 
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United States expects its European allies to contribute more both in monetary terms 
and in practice. As President Obama stated at the launch of ERI: They expect full 
OGODGTUJKRYJGPKVEQOGUVQVJGKTFGHGPUGVJGPVJCVOGCPUVJCVVJG[ŨXGCNUQIQVVQ
OCMGCEQPVTKDWVKQPVJCVKUEQOOGPUWTCVGYKVJHWNNOGODGTUJKRŨ11 In other words, 
participation in crisis management situations when called for is NOT an optional 
GZVTCDWVKUKPETGCUKPIN[VJGŧRTKEGŨVQDGRCKFHQTVJG#OGTKECPUGEWTKV[IWCTCPVGG+P
VJKUUGPUGVJGNKPMDGVYGGPEQNNGEVKXGFGHGPUGCPFETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVKUENGCTŤVJG
new transatlantic bargain will be based on a division of labor where the Americans 
deliver on collective defense and in return the European allies step up to the plate of 
crisis management when needed. 
There is understandably very little appetite in the Alliance at present for engagement 
in crisis management operations. More than a decade of involvement in Afghanistan 
has left its toll on the willingness of the Alliance to risk entanglement in protracted 
conflicts. Moreover, those members who have been consistently involved in high-end 
combat operations are facing serious issues of overuse of their deployable forces and 
GSWKROGPV6JKUHQTGZCORNGKUVJGECUGYKVJVJG&CPKUJ(ƒIJVGTEQPVTKDWVKQPVQ
the coalition (not a NATO operation) against Daesh, which has been temporarily 
suspended to allow personnel to recuperate and the planes to be overhauled. Yet as 
VJGITQYKPIKPUVCDKNKV[QP0#61ŨUUQWVJGTPDQTFGTUUJQYUKVKURTQDCDN[PCȒXGVQVJKPM
that there will be no call for crisis management in the near future. Moreover, it is 
important that the Alliance as a whole understands the link between the increasing 
demands for European contributions, including leadership, in crisis management 
UKVWCVKQPU KP 'WTQRGŨU XKEKPKV[ CPF VJG CNVGTGF UVTCVGIKE GPXKTQPOGPV +P VJG PGY
strategic environment, the stark reality is that the US will be increasingly preoccupied 
in Asia (and at home) and will expect Europeans to take the lead in all non-Article Five 
EQPVKPIGPEKGUKP'WTQRGŨUXKEKPKV[#UVJG'4+KPKVKCVKXGUUJQYUWEJCOQXGKUPQVCP
expression of US abandonment, but simply of a new transatlantic bargain resting on 
a geographical division of labor. There is little doubt that the Warsaw Summit will have 
VQ CFFTGUU VJG RGTEGKXGF FKUETGRCPE[ KP CVVGPVKQP DGVYGGP 0#61ŨU GCUVGTP CPF
southern flanks, that the southern members will demand a re-balance towards the 
crises in the Middle East and North Africa, and that the United States will stress its 
contribution in the ERI and expect tangible European commitments to enhancing 
0#61ŨU ETKUKU OCPCIGOGPV ECRCDKNKV[ KP TGVWTP 6JKU KU VJG PGY TGCNKV[ CPF 0#61
members will have to get used to thinking in these terms. 
COOPERATIVE SECURITY
5KPEGVJGŧGXGPVUŨQHRCTVPGTUJKRUCPFEQQRGTCVKXGUGEWTKV[JCXGQEEWRKGFCNGUU
prominent position in the deliberations of the Alliance than has been the case over the 
previous twenty years. In addition, there is perhaps an implicit understanding in the 
Alliance that issues related to partnership were settled by the 2011 Berlin agreement, 
which endorsed a new NATO Partnership Policy (NATO, 2011). Nevertheless the 
Wales Summit did contain two important decisions related to cooperative security: 
the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which aims to maintain and deepen the 
ability of partner forces to work alongside Allied forces, thus building on, and 
maintaining a level of interoperability that was largely achieved through the operations 
in Afghanistan and elsewhere; and the Defense and related Security Capacity Building 
+PKVKCVKXGYJKEJDWKNFUQP0#61ŨUGZVGPUKXGVTCEMTGEQTFCPFGZRGTVKUGKPUWRRQTVKPI
advising, assisting, training and mentoring countries requiring capacity-building. The 
NCVVGTKUCKOGFCVTGKPHQTEKPI0#61ŨUEQOOKVOGPVVQKVURCTVPGTPCVKQPUCPFVQGPCDNG
the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces as part of the 
#NNKCPEGŨUQXGTCNNEQPVTKDWVKQPVQKPVGTPCVKQPCNUGEWTKV[UVCDKNKV[CPFEQPHNKEVRTGXGPVKQP
However, although the two initiatives in the Wales Declaration certainly constitute a 
positive step forward, they do not reflect the importance that partnerships of many 
different kinds are likely to play in a multi-order world.
A return to a prominent role for collective security at the  
expense of cooperative security is unlikely to be the best  
solution for a multi-order world.
The shift in attention away from cooperative security is partly explained by the 
enhanced attention to collective security and is reminiscent of the switch between 
these two roles at the end of the Cold War, when a new emphasis on partnerships 
paved the way for a more prominent role for cooperative security, whilst collective 
security faded more into the background. Although it is arguably precisely this kind of 
HNGZKDKNKV[ VJCV JCU HCEKNKVCVGF 0#61ŨU GPFWTCPEG CETQUU XGT[ FKHHGTGPV UVTCVGIKE
environments, a return to a prominent role for collective security at the expense of 
cooperative security is unlikely to be the best solution for a multi-order world. As 
indicated by the many arrows in the graphical depiction of the multi-order world in 
Figure 1, a multi-order world will require many different forms of relationships, which 
are very likely to be based on a variety of different partnerships. This was fully 
understood by the proponents of the 2011 Berlin Agreement and the architects of the 
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2010 Strategic Concept, as well as in the preparations for the Strategic Concept in the 
so-called Expert Group under leadership of Madeleine Albright. What the architects of 
0#61ŨUPGYRCTVPGTUJKRRQNKE[JCXGKPEQOOQPKUVJCVVJG[CTGUVTQPICFXQECVGUQH
(and in some cases contributors to) the multi-partner narrative. This  narrative had a 
RTQOKPGPV RQUKVKQP KP VJG ƒTUV 1DCOC CFOKPKUVTCVKQP YJKEJ UVTQPIN[ CFXQECVGF C
YKFGXCTKGV[QHFKHHGTGPVRCTVPGTUJKRUŤKPENWFKPIFKHƒEWNVRCTVPGTUJKRUUWEJCUVJQUG
with Russia, and between NATO and the EU. Although the multi-partner narrative is 
different from the multi-order narrative in as much as the former is more optimistic 
about the prospects of promoting liberal values through partnerships, both narratives 
recognise the importance of partnerships and that the main challenge ahead is to 
establish a broad consensus on the principles for order-making in a global cooperative 
order. For this reason, it is useful to take a brief look at the 2011 Partnership Policy.
With regard to the issue of how the Alliance might adapt to a multi-order world and 
move forward at the Warsaw Summit, it is useful briefly to reiterate the distinction 
already made by the Alliance between three different categories of partnership.12 The 
ENCUUKƒECVKQPKPVTQFWEGFKPVJG$GTNKP#ITGGOGPVKUKORQTVCPVDGECWUGKVFKUVKPIWKUJGU
between partners along functional lines rather than by using geographical or value-
based criteria. 
THE THREE CURRENT CATEGORIES ARE:
Q Political Partners: partners with established partnership relations with NATO  
YJQCTGNKMGN[VQRCTVKEKRCVGKPUQOGQH0#61ŨURCTVPGTUJKRCEVKXKVKGUDWVYJQCTG
generally speaking not contributing to NATO-led operations.
Q Operational Partners: partners who participate in NATO-led operations and are 
TGICTFGFCUOCMKPICUKIPKƒECPVEQPVTKDWVKQPVQVJGO
Q Strategic Partners: partners with whom NATO may or may not have a formal 
partnership agreement, but with whom the Alliance has an interest in developing 
closer relations.13
In addition to these different categories of partnership, the Berlin Agreement also 
includes a ranked list of criteria for allocating NATO resources to partnership 
objectives. It is worth reproducing the list in its entirety, as it provides the main tangible 
clue to the value NATO attaches to individual partnerships. As can be seen from the 
list, the criteria of shared values ranks high on the list, even if it is absent in the three 
categories of partnership. 
THE ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN ALLOCATING PARTNER-RELATED 
RESOURCES ARE:
Q Whether the partner concerned aspires to join the Alliance.
Q Whether the partner in question shares the values on which NATO is based and, 





Q Whether the partner is of special strategic importance for NATO.
Q Whether the partner has a special and developed bilateral cooperation framework 
with the Alliance.
Q 6JGECRCEKV[QHVJGRCTVPGTVQƒPCPEGKVUEQQRGTCVKXGCEVKXKVKGUYKVJ0#61
Q Whether the cooperative activity is in accordance with the priority areas as  
outlined in this policy (NATO, 2011: 3).
The cooling of relations with Russia and a growing realization that NATO may in some 
cases be more eager to seek out partnerships than prospective partners are in 
entering into partnerships with NATO have contributed to an apparently diminished 
enthusiasm for partnerships and cooperative security in the Alliance. However, such 
a reaction would appear to be a mistake. The demands of the coming multi-order 
world call for increased rather than diminished attention to partnerships, although 
partnerships will have to be approached in a much more pragmatic manner, with the 
WPFGTUVCPFKPIVJCVNKOKVGFCPFKUUWGURGEKƒERCTVPGTUJKRUDCUGFQPUJCTGFKPVGTGUVU
rather than shared values may hold a valuable potential for working across lines that 
would otherwise divide. For this reason, NATO could do well to reconsider its ranked 
list of criteria for resourcing partnerships by moving the question of whether the 
partner is of special strategic importance for NATO up the list. In doing so, it should 
RTKQTKVK\GVJGECVGIQT[QHRCTVPGTUJKRUMPQYPCUŧUVTCVGIKERCTVPGTUJKRUŨOQTGENGCTN[
VJCPJCUJKVJGTVQDGGPVJGECUGKPENWFKPIYKVJUVCVGUIGQITCRJKECNN[HCTCƒGNFUWEJ
as India and China, as well as with international organizations such as the EU, the 
African Union (AU) and ASEAN. 
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This report has examined how NATO might move forward in a world that is 
EJCTCEVGTK\GFD[ŧEQORQWPFKPIEQORNGZKV[ŨCPFYJKEJUGGOUVQDGOQXKPIVQYCTFU
CPGYUVTCVGIKEGPXKTQPOGPVCTIWGFJGTGVQDGCŧOWNVKQTFGTYQTNFŨ+PRCTVKEWNCTVJG
report has focused on how the Alliance might move forward from the decisions taken 
at the Wales Summit in September 2014 to be able to prepare for a multi-order world 
CVVJG9CTUCY5WOOKVKP,WN[6JGEJCNNGPIGHQT0#61YKNNDGVQƒPFCYC[VQ
contribute to European and global security in a shifting strategic environment that 
NQQMUUGV VQCHHQTF VJG#NNKCPEGCPF ŧVJG9GUVŨCFKOKPKUJGF TQNGCOQPICITQYKPI
number of new and (re)-emerging actors, and within a climate in which liberal values 
and Western principles of order-making can no longer be assumed to be (almost) 
universally accepted. The report has argued that, while this may not be the world of 
0#61ŨUEJQKEGKVKUNKMGN[VQDGVJGYQTNFCUKVTGCNN[KU1PVJGDCUKUQHVJGCPCN[UKUKP
this report, it appears that NATO (and indeed the West more generally) should prioritize 
two overarching strategic goals:
Q To work towards establishing the conditions for a peaceful transformation to a 
cooperative multi-order world by seeking a working consensus on order-making 
principles at the global level.
Q 6QYQTMVQYCTFUUVTGPIVJGPKPIVJGŧNKDGTCNEQTGŨQHVJGNKDGTCNQTFGTD[CFFTGUUKPI
existing internal weaknesses, living up to its own liberal principles, and continuing 
to encourage those states that share liberal core values to associate themselves 
with the liberal order.14 
CONCLUSION
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NATO can, of course, only play a limited role in working towards these two overarching 
goals, but they should nevertheless be regarded as the guiding principles informing 
NATO policies. 
The Wales initiatives can be seen as an important contribution to the second strategic 
goal. The reassurance and adaptation measures adopted in Wales address 




the importance of the crisis in Ukraine should not be underestimated, and even though 
those arguing that Russia could not be trusted were vindicated, the call for the Alliance 
VQ ŧIQDCEMVQDCUKEUŨOWUVDGTGUKUVGF6JGRTQDNGO KU VJCVIQKPI ŧDCEMVQDCUKEUŨ
assumes a largely unchanged strategic environment and implies a downgrading of 
0#61ŨUQVJGTTQNGUYJKNUVHCKNKPIVQCRRTGEKCVGVJGKORQTVCPEGQHVJGUVTCVGIKEIQCNQH
seeking a consensus on order-making at the global level. Focusing exclusively on 
ŧIQKPIDCEMVQDCUKEUŨYQWNFVJGTGHQTGEQPUVKVWVGCOCLQTGTTQT
Although the importance of the crisis in Ukraine should not be 
underestimated, and even though those arguing that Russia 
could not be trusted were vindicated, the call for the Alliance to 
go back to basics must be resisted.
Crisis management remains a crucial core task of the Alliance because the transition 
to a new international order is likely to be accompanied by an increased risk of 
instability, unrest and armed conflict.15 However, it is true that, although NATO might 
have the capabilities for undertaking crisis management operations in the future, the 
Alliance should consider very carefully whether its involvement is the right way to 
RTQEGGFQTYJGVJGTQVJGTCEVQTUOC[DGDGVVGTUWKVGFŤRQUUKDN[YKVJ0#61UWRRQTV
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the need for crisis management will lessen in 
years to come or that the need for NATO to undertake crisis management operations 
YKNNDGUKIPKƒECPVN[TGFWEGF*QYGXGTETKUKUOCPCIGOGPVKUPQVLWUVKORQTVCPVCUC
policy tool in a changing strategic environment, it is also an essential element of the 
UGEQPF UVTCVGIKE QDLGEVKXG Ť VQ UVTGPIVJGP VJG NKDGTCN EQTG %TKUKU OCPCIGOGPV KU
increasingly becoming an important part of maintaining Alliance cohesion. This is the 
case internally amongst the European members, where the recent emphasis on the 
threat from the east has prompted the southern members to argue that threats also 
GZKUVUQP0#61ŨUUQWVJGTPDQTFGTU/QTGQXGTCUGORJCUK\GFKPVJKUTGRQTV'WTQRGCP
willingness to contribute to crisis management when called for is NOT an optional 
extra, but is very much an expectation in return for the continued American 
commitment to Article Five protection of its European allies. 
It would be a strategic error if NATO was to not remain ahead of 
the game in terms of building partnerships with countries that 
are thought to be of strategic value to the Alliance.
(KPCNN[VJGVJKTFEQTGVCUMŤEQQRGTCVKXGUGEWTKV[ŤCRRGCTUVQDGCNOQUVFKUCRRGCTKPI
QTCUQPGQHVJQUGKPVGTXKGYGFHQTVJKUTGRQTVGZRTGUUGFKVŧVQDGHCNNKPIQHHVJGYCIQPŨ
If this trend were to continue, the West would be depriving itself of a potentially 
important avenue towards establishing the conditions for a peaceful transformation 
to a cooperative multi-order world. In a multi-order world, relationships of many 
different kinds will be required to facilitate cooperation across dividing lines. In addition 
it is likely that current global multilateral institutional structures will suffer from a 
FGENKPG KP NGIKVKOCE[ CPF GHƒEKGPE[ JGPEG QRGPKPI WR C PGGF HQT OQTG RTCIOCVKE
frameworks for meeting collective challenges. In the multi-order world, partnerships 
CPFEQCNKVKQPUQHVJGYKNNKPIDCUGFQPUJCTGF KPVGTGUVU KPURGEKƒERQNKE[ KUUWGUCTG
therefore likely to take on an increasingly important role. In such a situation, it would 
be a strategic error if NATO was to not remain ahead of the game in terms of building 
partnerships with countries that are thought to be of strategic value to the Alliance. 
*QYGXGTFQKPIUQŤCPFFQKPIKVKPCYC[VJCVOKIJVEQPVTKDWVGVQVJGQXGTCNNUVTCVGIKE
goal of ensuring a peaceful transformation to a new international order in which 
FKXGTIGPEGKPDQVJRQYGTCPFRTKPEKRNGYKNNDGMG[EJCTCEVGTKUVKEUŤYKNNTGSWKTGVJG
Alliance to revisit the issue of partnership and build on the principles established in the 
2011 Berlin agreement. At present there is no sign of such a renewed effort to establish 
new strategic partnerships or to deepen and widen existing ones. Indeed, to establish 
the political conditions within NATO to return to cooperative security with a renewed 
GORJCUKUQPRCTVPGTUJKRUOC[YGNNDGVJGOQUVFKHƒEWNVRQNKVKECNEJCNNGPIGHCEKPIVJG
#NNKCPEGKPVJGUJQTVVGTOŤ[GVKHKVHCKNUVQFQUQVJCVEQWNFYGNNWPFGTOKPGVJGXGT[
foundations of its own existence in the long term.    
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